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Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Appellant replies to Respondent's Brief as follows:
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In their brief, Respondents continue in their position
taken at trial that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase (hereinafter the "Agreement"), admittedly entered
into by the parties was too vague, ambiguous and uncertain to
be capable of specific performance.

This Court, subsequent

to submission of Appellant's Brief, has rendered an opinion
reaffirming the applicable law and establishing that an Agreement of the type at issue is enforceable.
POINT I
AN AGREEMENT IS NOT FATALLY VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN IF THERE IS
A METHOD OF ESTABLISHING ITS TERMS.
In Ferris

~·

Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979), this

Court on April 25, 1979, held that if the Trial Court has
based its ruling upon a misapplication or misunderstanding of
law and a correct one might have resulted in a different
ruling, the party adversly affected is entitled to have the
error corrected.

Id. at 859.

The Court further held and re-

affirmed the proposition that parties are obligated to act in
good faith to.perform in accordance with an agreement's
expressed intent and that an agreement is not fatally vague
if there exists a formula for or method of fixing its terms.
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We have no disagreement with the general proposition that a contract will not be specifically
enforced unless the obligations of the parties are
'set forth with sufficient definiteness that it
can be performed.' But to be considered therewith
is the further proposition that the parties to a
contract are obliged to proceed in good faith to
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance
with its expressed intent. A contract is not
fatally defective as to price if there if an agreement as to some formula or method for fixing it.
Id. at 859.
Ferris was an eviction action commenced by the Plaintiff to evict the Defendant from possession of real property.
The Trial Court found that Defendant was in possession under
an oral contract to purchase which was not sufficiently
definite for enforcement.

Plaintiff had purchased the prop-

erty at Defendant's request because Defendant needed someone
to finance it for her, and Plaintiff had orally agreed to
subsequently sell to Defendant for a specified price "plus a
fair commission."

The oral agreement did not specify the

time for payment of the purchase price.
This Court held that neither failure to specify the
amount of commission nor the time for payment rendered the
agreement fatally defective.

The rationale of Ferris was that

the doctrine of reasonableness is a standard by which both
the amount of commission and time for payment of the purchase
price could be ascertained, enabling the oral agreement to
be specifically enforced.
In the instant case, the Trial Court found the terms
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referring to the property description and terms for payment
to have been fatally vague, notwithstanding that the Agreement clearly stated that the property was to be purchased for
a specified price.

Yet as in Ferris, supra, there existed

methods and standards for determining the intent of the Agreement with respect to these terms which the Trial Court should
have applied.
A.

Property Description
Respondents offered no evidence at trial that they

owned other property in the vicinity of the "corner of
Hillview and Ninth East" in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was
the description in the Agreement.

Respondents acknowledged

they owned three lots in that vicinity and that they had agreed
to sell all three to different purchasers, one of which was
to be sold to Appellant.

Respondents were to determine which

lots were to be sold to each of the three purchasers.

Res-

pendent Michael Alvey testified as follows:

Q Well, you would agree with me, would you not,
that whoever took which particular lot, C. Howard Alvey
& Sons agreed to sell all three lots, did they not?
A

Yes

Q You would have to arrive at whether or not one
party was going to take Lot 1, 2 or 3, or vice versa,
is that correct?

A
(R. 96).

Yes
Furthermore, prior to any attempted closing of

Appellant's purchase, Respondents had determined that the
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other two lots would go to the other two buyers and had
closed the purchase of them by the other two buyers.

This

left only one lot applicable to Appellant's purchase, which
lot he was willing to and desired to take [R. 96-97).
Thus, Respondents were to select the lot and fourplex
to be purchased by Appellant from three contiguous lots they
owned.

They, in fact, did select which lot of the three that

Appellant was to receive by having designated and conveyed
two of those lots to the other two buyers.

This standard of

determining the property to be sold has previously been approved
by this Court in quoting with approval the Kansas Supreme Court
in Peckham v. Lane, 106 P. 464, 466

(Kansas 1910).

No reason is apparrent why a person may not make a
valid contract that he will sell to another one of
several pieces of real estate of which he is the
owner, to be selected by himself. When an agreement
to that effect is written out and signed, it is a
complete contract, all of the terms of which are
expressed in writing. The owner agrees that he will
first make the selection and then make the conveyance
If he refuses to do either, a court may compel him
to do both.
But he cannot avoid the obligation
to which he has committed himself in writing, merely
by refusing to act at all.
Calder v. Third Judicial District Court, 273 P.2d 168, 170
(Utah 1954).
B.

Terms for Payment
With respect to payment of the balance of the purchase

price over and above the $500.00 earnest money paid, the Agreement provided "terms to be arranged."

[PLS Exh. 1.).

The

intent of such terms of the Agreement, as shown by testimony
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at trial, was that Appellant would pay the balance in cash
at closing.

Even if that had not been the case, however,

application of the reasonableness standard renders this language certain.
Appellant testified that the balance of the purchase
price was to have been paid in cash at closing which amount
was to have been acquired through financing [R. 57-59).
Appellant had immediately made application with Zions First
National Bank for financing [R. 58, 104] and was a qualified
borrower for the amount needed [R. 58, 102-103].

In fact,

Respondents obtained their construction loan from Zions First
National Bank to build the fourplex on Appellant's lot on the
basis of Appellant being a pre-approved qualified buyer of
the property [R. 101-104].

Respondent's real estate agent,

who prepared the Agreement and arranged for sale, understood
the meaning of such language to be that Appellant would arrange
financing and pay the balance in cash at closing [R. 121, 122].
Respondents were informed by such agent and understood that
Appellant was to obtain financing and pay cash at closing
[R. 121-123].
[R. 123].

Respondents did not object to such arrangement

Respondents presented no testimony that "terms to

be arranged" meant something different from the foregoing understanding thereof, or that Respondents had at any time before
trial asserted that the words "terms to be arranged" ment something other than Respondent's real estate agent understood
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and explained them.
Respondents reliance in their belief on the fact that
financing proceeds were never actually obtained by Appellant is
immaterial.

Since Respondents refused to close the transaction,

there was no need to close the financing.
The Trial Court based its ruling on a misunderstanding
or misapplication of the law.

The Trial Court failed to apply

equitable considerations which upon proper application to the
testimony adduced at trial clearly and unambiguously proves
the intent of the Agreement and all parties thereto with respect
to identity of the property and payment therefor.

In addition,

the Ferris rationale requires the Respondents to have acted in
good faith.

Upon taking into account the testimony adduced at

trial, payment of cash at closing, as Appellant desired to do,
was reasonable.

If Appellant (contrary to all testimony on

this subject) had not been able to pay cash at closing then
Respondents would have been relieved from conveying the property
and would have had their own remedies under the Agreement.

There

fore, to permit a seller of property to willfully abandon the
terms of a contract prior to the date on which the buyer must
perform is to ignore the "good faith" rationale of Ferris.

The

"good faith" rationale of Ferris clearly sustains the Appellant''
ownership of the subject property.
CONCLUSION
When applying equitable standards approved and required
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by this Court, the Agreement was not vague, ambiguous or
uncertain, and it should be specifically enforced.

Applica-

tion of the Ferris rationale to the facts of this case clearly
establishes all terms of the Agreement; namely,

(1)

Respondents

agreed to sell a lot and fourplex to Appellant for a specific
price;

(2)

Respondents designated which lot and fourplex was

to be sold to Appellant by having conveyed to others the other
two of three lots agreed to be sold under similar agreements;

(3)

Respondents accepted Appellants earnest money;

(4)

Respondents obtained a construction loan on the lot and fourplex on the basis of Appellant being a pre-approved buyer of
the same; and (5)

Respondents required Appellant to deposit

$13,500.00 in escrow as evidence he could complete the purchase.
DATED September

~'

1979
Respectfully Submitted:
PARSONS & CROWTHER

By~~~

;/Parsons

-11~

jBy

)/

~

Thomas N. Crowther
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief were served
upon Respondents by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to their
attorney, Harold A. Hintze, at 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, 36
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

~~ay

of September, 1979.
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